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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines recent evidence from Denmark and abroad regarding climate change 
projects that aim to reduce global carbon dioxide emissions by converting coal-fired thermal 
power plants to solid biomass fuel. The paper argues that projects appear to be pursued narrow-
mindedly with insufficient attention paid to safety and points to evidence of media shifting - that 
the 'resolution' of a problem within the environmental domain creates a new problem in the 
workplace safety domain. From the perspective of inherent safety the paper argues that the 
conversion is a step in the wrong direction as a low risk fuel is substituted for a less safe one.  
Because of rapid scale-up and handling of unprecedented quantities, solid biomass qualify as an 
emerging risk for which proper control strategies have yet to be developed. The paper finally 
argues that the tendency to prioritize environmental benefits over safety concerns seems to run 
deep and not confined to the realm of only solid biomass. Danish environmental ambitions are 
very high and the costs to society of introducing solid biomass fuels are breathtaking. In this 
setting, the general failure to address safety risks appears particularly disheartening. 
 
Key Words: climate change, sustainable energy, media shifting, inherent safety, wood pellets, 
dust explosion, smoldering fire, workplace safety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Media Shifting and Inherent Safety 
Environmental interventions may be undertaken with insufficient attention paid to 
workplace safety (Ashford 1997; Hedlund 2002). Two types of sub-optimalities can be 
identified: 1) media shifting, which occurs if the 'resolution' of a problem within the 
environmental domain gives rise to new, and unforeseen, problems within other domains, 
specifically the workplace safety domain; 2) missed opportunity, which occurs if an opportunity 
exists for improving both environmental and occupational health and safety performance, but a 
less optimal solution is chosen that only addresses environmental performance. 
The concept of inherent safety, sometimes referred to as primary prevention, relies on 
preventing the possibility of an accident. By comparison, secondary prevention relies on reducing 
the probability of an accident. Mitigation seeks to reduce the seriousness of the consequences, 
i.e., injuries and damage to the environment or property. Inherent safety is seen as a key accident 
prevention strategy (Ashford 1997; Zwetsloot and Ashford 2003; Ashford 2012; Hedlund et al. 
2014). 
This paper argues that the unsafe properties of solid biomass have been given insufficient 
attention in the haste to cut greenhouse gas emissions and examines this climate change 
intervention in the context of inherent safety and media shifting. 
 
European Climate Change Initiatives 
The EU Energy and Climate Change Package was adopted by the European Council on 
April 6, 2009. As part of this package the Renewable Energy Directive (OJ 2009) entered into 
force on June 25, 2009. The Package includes the “20/20/20” goals for 2020:  
• A 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990.  
• A 20% improvement in energy efficiency compared to forecasts for 2020.  
• A 20% share for renewable energy in the EU total energy mix. 
The last goal is an overall EU goal. The Directive sets different national targets for member 
states within this overall goal, based on each member state’s capacity. Denmark, for example, 
will have to reach 30%, while the target for Malta is 10% (OJ 2009).  
The European Commission expects heat and power production from biomass to play an 
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important role in meeting the 20% target for renewable energy use by 2020 and in the future 
reduction of CO2 emissions in Europe. The EU is currently the world’s largest wood pellets 
market, with a consumption in metric units of approximately 14.3 megatons (Mt) of pellets in 
2012, rising from 4.6 Mt in 2006. The demand is expected to continue to rise to approximately 
17 Mt in 2014. Consumption forecasts for 2020 range from 35 Mt for Western Europe to 50‒80 
Mt for the total EU. Since 2008, the demand for pellets has significantly outpaced domestic 
production in Europe. This has resulted in increased imports from the United States, Canada, 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other countries (FAS 2013). 
 
Danish Climate Change Initiatives 
Denmark’s climate policy is very ambitious. In March 2012, Germany announced it would 
spend 200 billion EUR, corresponding to 8% of its 2011 GDP, on a plan to shift to renewable 
energy. This would result in Germany having 80% of its energy from renewable sources by 2050 
(BI 2012a). Shortly after, in Denmark, the minister for climate change, Martin Lidegaard, then 
announced the "broadest, greenest, and most long-term energy agreement that has ever been 
reached in Denmark". With the audacious plan, “Denmark will once again be the global leader 
in the transition to green energy”, said the minister (BI 2012b, DEA 2012a). The Danish plan 
calls for 50% of the electricity consumption to be supplied by wind power, and to have more than 
35% of final energy consumption supplied from renewable energy sources by 2020. The long-
term goal of the plan is to have a 100% conversion to renewable energy sources by 2050 
(DMCEB 2012).  
Due to generous subsidies, windmills already accounted for more than 25% of Denmark's 
electricity consumption in 2012. The 2012 energy agreement goes further by the substitution of 
coal for solid biomass fuel in thermal power plants.  
Costs are very large, mainly because the price of solid biomass is double or triple that of 
coal. Benefits comprise reduced emissions of greenhouse gasses of which the monetary value can 
be estimated from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) prices. Following 
this line of reasoning, a socioeconomic analysis estimates a benefit/cost ratio of 0.4, i.e., that 
benefits amount to only 0.40 cent for each Euro spent on substitution of coal for solid biomass 
fuel (Johannsen 2011). Many uncertainties influence the estimation, in particular assumptions 
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regarding the future supply, demand, and price situation for solid biomass and for EU ETC 
emission allowances. That uncertainties are large is evidenced by the fact that carbon prices on 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme collapsed in 2013 (Econ 2013). Ignoring 
benefits, the present value of costs for the anticipated biomass conversion at Danish power plants 
is estimated at about 24 billion EUR (2011 prices). To provide a sense of scale and magnitude, 
this amount corresponds to about 10% of Denmark's 2011 gross national product. Needless to 
say, this constitutes only a fraction of the total costs of the Danish energy plan, which also 
comprises subsidies to windmills, biogas, solar energy, etc.  
 
Solid Biomass Fuel in Thermal Power Plants 
Solid biomass refers to non-fossilized carbon-based solid materials derived from plants, 
such as wood chips, waste wood, straw, milling residues, and certain energy crops grown 
primarily for the purpose of fuel utilization. Although solid biomass fuel is more expensive than 
coal it can be made financially feasible, as opposed to economically feasible, by a combination of 
subsidies and price distorting levies. As a result, Denmark's thermal power generation sector is 
undergoing a major transformation to be able to handle the new type of fuel. 
Thermal power plants consume very large amounts of fuel. For instance, Unit One at 
Amagerværket near Copenhagen, which entered into dedicated biomass fuel service by mid-
2010, consumes about 450,000 t of solid biomass fuel per year. In order for the logistics chain to 
handle such large quantities, the biomass is processed into pellets, usually about 8 mm in 
diameter and 20‒25 mm length. In the manufacturing process, the biomass is milled to a powder 
and then compressed into pellets, using die ring press and compression roller technology. The 
electricity consumption is significant. Due to compression heat, pellets exiting the die are too hot 
to touch and they may even carbonize in the die and block the bores. Some of the biomass for 
Danish power plants is shipped half-way round the globe from plantations in North America or 
Africa that operate according to sustainable environmental management principles. Because the 
pellets' energy content per unit volume is anywhere from half to one-third of that of coal, 
handling and storage facilities at the power plant must double or triple in capacity. Large thermal 
power plants are dust fired and the pellets will therefore be ground back to dust immediately 
before being blown into the fluidized bed combustion zone.  
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HAZARDS OF SOLID BIOFUELS 
Key Issues  
The hazard profile of biomass pellets is much different from that of coal. Biomass pellets 
may well qualify as an emerging risk for which proper control strategies have yet to be 
developed. There are two key issues. The first relates to the mechanical stability (friability) of the 
pellets and the generation of dust. The second relates to the complex hazard profile of this 
combustible dust. 
 
Dust Explosion 
When handled, biomass pellets generate fine dust in quantities posing a risk for dust 
explosions. The coal used in Danish power plants also generates dust during handling, but in 
smaller quantities and usually coarser, although coal silo dust explosions are a recognized hazard. 
The storage areas present new emerging risks. Coal is not sensitive to moisture and is usually 
stored bulk in large outdoor piles. In contrast, biomass pellets do not tolerate moisture, which 
turns them into a worthless viscous sludge. Pellets must therefore be handled under roof or in 
silos. The limited ventilation in such enclosures increases the dust explosion probability, and the 
confinement aggravates the severity of the blast, should an explosion occur. In contrast to coal, 
the biomass pellet dust explosion risks affect the entire logistics chain.1 
Dust explosions have traditionally been difficult to deal with in industry. Part of the 
problem lies with the limited general understanding of the complex mechanism of dust 
explosions among plant operating personnel as well as corporate management. Dust explosions 
can either be primary or secondary. A primary dust explosion occurs when a dust suspension 
within a container, room, or piece of equipment is ignited and explodes. In contrast, a secondary 
explosion occurs when combustible dust, which has been allowed to settle and accumulate on 
floors or other horizontal surfaces due to inadequate housekeeping or inadequate local exhaust 
ventilation, is made airborne by the pressure wave of primary explosion and subsequently ignited 
                                                     
1 Some coals can also affect the entire logistics chain. US Powder River Basin (PRB) coal is more friable, the 
ignition sensitivity is lower and explosive severity is higher than other coal grades. 
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by the slower moving subsonic flame front. Depending on the extent of the dust deposits, a weak 
primary explosion may cause very powerful and catastrophic secondary dust explosions.  
Dust explosion hazards can be difficult to recognize because the workplace, when 
superficially inspected, may falsely appear dust free due to unseen dust deposits in hard to reach 
overhead areas and where the atmosphere presents as free of dust and safe at face value. 
Additionally, dust may appear coarse on inspection but the fine dust responsible for the first 
explosion may accumulate over time in hard to reach locations such as on top of overhead I-
beams, lighting fixtures, etc.  
The explosion severity or dust deflagration index (Kst) and the maximum pressure (Pmax) 
provide single number indicators of the outcome of a dust explosion. The larger the value for Kst 
and Pmax the more severe the explosion. Example Kst values for coal dust, which indicate the rate 
of pressure rise, may be in the range of 125 whereas wood dust may have Kst values around 160 
(Melin 2008). Although measurements are carried out according to American Society for Testing 
of Materials (ASTM) or European Committee for Standardization (CEN) standard test 
conditions, measured values may exhibit considerable variation due to differences in moisture 
content, particle size distribution and chemical composition. To our knowledge, measurements of 
dust from biomass pellets have occasionally produced Kst values in excess of 200. Huéscar et al. 
(2013) point to a number of uncertainties in the test procedure and observe that Kst and Pmax 
values of biomass powders are often over- or underestimated and flammability limits do not 
agree in many cases when using standard equipment. They argue that there is a lack of reliable 
data of biomass explosibility. 
Good control of ignition sources is an essential part of any dust explosion risk management 
strategy and is codified into European ATEX (ATmosphères EXplosibles) legislation. Hedlund 
et al. (2014) argue that available guidelines for ATEX hazardous area classification for 
combustible dust are insufficiently developed, in particular when compared with the far more 
detailed guidelines available for flammable gasses and vapors. The absence of detailed 
recommended guidelines gives ample room for potentially erroneous subjective individual 
judgment in hazardous area classifications for combustible dust, ultimately to the effect that the 
control of potential sources of ignition may be inadequate. 
For sake of comparison, "ordinary" industrial dust explosions are known to have 
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catastrophic potential, like the sugar dust explosion that ravaged the Imperial Sugar refinery in 
Georgia, USA, in 2008 and killed 14 people (CSB 2009). Experience has also shown that wood 
dust certainly has catastrophic potential. A wood dust explosion destroyed the Babine Forest 
sawmill in British Columbia, Canada, on January 20, 2012, killing two workers and injuring 20 
others (WorkSafeBC 2013). A few months later, on April 23, 2012, another wood dust explosion 
levelled the Lakeland Mills sawmill in British Columbia, Canada. The explosion travelled 
through the premises and collapsed the main lunchroom walls onto the workers assembled there. 
Workers in the basement-level lunchroom were blown out a wall by the force of the explosion. 
Two workers died as a result of their injuries, and 22 others were injured. (WorkSafeBC 2014). 
The explosion was powerful enough to blow debris 400 meters away from the sawmill and shake 
buildings and rattle windows several kilometers away (VS 2012).  
 
Ease of Ignition and Smoldering Fires  
Experience has shown that dust from biomass pellets easily ignites. Likely ignition sources 
are overheated rotating devices (ball bearing, idler, guide roller, etc.) or an electrostatic discharge 
or mechanical spark, for instance from a piece of iron or a stone transported with the biomass. 
Biomass pellet piles are also known to self-ignite, particularly if moist. Smoldering fires are 
difficult to detect and the smoldering particles may migrate in the band conveyor systems. 
Smoldering fires may develop into massive storage fires and cause considerable damage to 
process equipment and property. Worse, smoldering fires may act as sources of ignition, when 
pellets are transported and inevitably generate airborne dust, triggering a primary dust explosion 
or flash fire presenting serious risk to nearby personnel.  
Smoldering fires are notorious for their capacity to generate pyrolysis gasses that travel and 
accumulate, leading to flash fires or explosion hazards when firefighters attempt to attack the 
fire. Smoldering fires in silos have an additional hazard in the generation of pyrolysis gases 
providing a fuel rich atmosphere above the upper explosion limit. This condition can rapidly 
change when firefighters open silo access covers during firefighting activities introducing 
oxygen, which then creates an explosive atmosphere resulting in a severe backdraft explosion. 
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Carbon Monoxide 
Biomass pellets emit carbon monoxide, which has produced fatal accidents in cargo ships 
or in storage silos. Fatal accidents have also occurred in wood pellet storerooms of private 
households even though the compartments were ventilated in accordance with normal building 
codes (Gauthier et al. 2012). 
 
SOLID BIOMASS FUELS – EVIDENCE OF AN EMERGING RISK 
Data Sources 
Biomass pellets are not classified as a dangerous substance and to our knowledge there is 
currently no mechanism to register fire and explosion incidents specifically involving biomass 
pellets. This would particularly be true for fires and explosions that only cause damage to 
company property. This class of events is highly significant to safety professionals though, as 
they can be interpreted as precursors to more serious accidents, i.e., that they under marginally 
different circumstances would have led to a worse outcome, involving human casualty (Phimister 
et al. 2004).  
There are numerous news media reports of fires and explosions involving biomass pellets. 
Information is often sketchy, as news media are interested in the immediate event and prioritize 
promptness over accuracy. It takes considerable effort and time to identify causes, indicating heat 
sources, equipment involved ignition, area of origin, and contributing factors, including 
organizational issues, and at this stage media interest has usually long waned. We personally 
know of fires and explosions that did not find way into the media and expect that this occurs 
frequently.  
The combustible dust-related incidents listed below have been selected for the following 
reasons: 1) they illustrate the inherent hazards of biomass pellets discussed above; 2) they 
illustrate the vulnerability of the installations and the damage caused by fires and explosions; 3) 
they show the difficulties and complexities that emergency responders face; 4) they show 
accidents are ubiquitous, no country or region is spared; or 5) for sites where multiple incidents 
have taken place, because they give an indication of the prevalence, if not normalcy, of such 
events. 
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Incidents 
Major storage fire, Denmark (2012) 
On August 12, 2012, employees noticed smoke from a biomass pellet conveyor belt at 30 
m height at Avedøreværket, a thermal power plant in Denmark, on the outskirts of Copenhagen. 
The incident is described by Weinreich (2012) but many details are sketchy. Reportedly, the 
incident took place when pellets were being unloaded from a ship. It was speculated that an 
overheated roller bearing in the transport conveyor system had ignited the pellets. At the time of 
discovery of the fire, smoldering pellets had already entered the 45,000 m3 storage silo (the 
“small storage silo”). The information available indicates that the fire design case involved self-
ignition of pellets in the silo, for which the silo had an inert gas system. The actual fire was more 
intense than the design case however, and the inert gas supply quickly became exhausted. There 
was no fixed sprinkler system in the silo.  
Fire hoses were not engaged out of fears for kicking up dust, triggering a dust explosion. 
The concern was that the concrete silo walls would be unable to withstand the blast, perhaps 
even endangering the nearby power plant at distance 400 m. Water is also unwanted in the silo, 
as the pellets were said to expand five-fold, the pressure exerted could lead to a silo collapse, 
which would cause destruction to extensive subterranean conveyor systems. Daily, 170 t of inert 
gasses were trucked in to quench the fire, local production capacity was exceeded and supplies 
came in from southern Sweden. The fire was only extinguished after almost 2 weeks of 
firefighting, which involved emptying the silo and moving the pellets to large piles outside. Ten 
days into the incident a smoldering fire was discovered in the "large storage silo" with a pellet 
capacity of 100,000 m3, said to be one of the largest of its kind in the world. This fire was 
eventually successfully extinguished. The 45,000 m3 storage silo was a complete loss however, 
and there was extensive damage to conveyor systems. Although the power plant is located well 
away from populated areas nearby residents were nevertheless requested to have windows shut 
because of the considerable smoke generation. There were no injuries as a result of the fires. The 
Danish fire and rescue services later said it was one of the most complex fires they had faced in 
recent times (Weinreich 2012). 
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Belt conveyor systems ignite pellets, two cases from USA (2012) 
At Avedøreværket, pellets on fire entered the silo from the top via a conveyor belt. There 
are several similar incidents abroad. According to news reports it happened, for instance, three 
months prior to the DONG incident in the wood pellet conveyors and storage silo of Port Panama 
City, Florida, USA, on May 3, 2012 (Osborne 2012), and 2 weeks later, on May 16, in the 
conveyors/silos of the Port of Savannah, Georgia, USA, also involving wood pellets (SMN 
2012). 
  
Dust explosion in silo, Denmark (2012)  
On May 11, 2012, a dust explosion occurred in a biomass pellets silo at Amagerværket, 
another thermal power plant in Copenhagen, which injured three persons. The case is described 
by Andersen (2012). The dust explosion hazard had not been recognized and the accident took 
place when contractors were clearing out a silo blockage using a so-called bang-and-clean 
method without taking proper precautions. This method is commonly used to clean boiler tubes 
for slag deposits and involves a controlled explosion of a bag filled with methane and oxygen. 
The shockwave is intended to dislodge the deposits from the boiler tubes after which they fall to 
the fire box floor. The accident took place when the controlled explosion ignited biomass dust in 
the silo. A contractor was injured with burns to 20% of the body, but the accident appears to have 
had multiple fatality potential (Andersen 2012).  
The same power plant experienced a biomass pellet silo fire Dec 17, 2012. At the time of 
the fire the silo held 4,000 t of pellets (Bredsdorff 2012). Information is sketchy but it appears the 
fire was extinguished without incident. 
 
Fire causes extensive power station damage, UK (2012) 
In February 2012, the Tilbury Power Station, UK, was ravaged by a fire in 4,000-6,000 t of 
wood pellets. The fire started in a hopper containing the wooden pellets and was described by 
one senior fire officer as among the most challenging he had dealt with in his 20-year career. 
The fire spread to biomass conveyors high up in the power station building. The fuel goes 
into vats and is taken into the plant on a conveyor belt. There were several concerns. For 
instance, the fuel cells are designed to carry dry fuel so pouring water on to them and making 
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them significantly heavier could potentially damage the structure of the building. Additionally, 
there was a concern that when the cells get wet, then dried by the fire, a crust will develop, 
making it impossible for more water to penetrate the fire underneath. More than 120 firefighters 
from across the county had been dispatched to fight the fire. Opened in 1969, Tilbury previously 
operated as a coal-fired power station but was converted to generate power from 100% 
sustainable biomass (Guardian 2012). 
Systems were extensively damaged. The first of the station’s three units was returned to 
service only after more than 3½ months of repairs. The fire is thought to have developed from a 
localized smoldering incident. Despite fire suppressant foam had been used to cap the affected 
areas, significant air drafts led to fire intensification, which damaged hoppers and conveyor 
systems (PE 2012). There are no reports of injuries. 
 
Dust explosion in bulk storage building, pellet plant, Denmark (2010) 
On September 16, 2010, a dust explosion took place at a biomass pellet manufacturer near 
the small town of Aars, Denmark. The facility produced biomass pellets for the domestic stoker 
furnace home heating market and received waste wood chips from furniture manufacturing and a 
wide range of other waste wood or biomass streams. The pellet manufacturing units were located 
in a neighbor building and a front wheel loader grabbed milled raw materials from different cell 
compartments inside a storage building and dropped them into a mixing feeder chute that fed the 
pellet presses. The front loader made wood dust airborne and ignited the dust resulting in flash 
fire and a confined explosion. The driver received fatal burn injuries and the entire storage 
building burned down. The likely source of ignition was the parking brake of the wheel loader, 
which was not released and quickly overheated. The facility experienced another serious 
explosion in 2002, which destroyed the same storage building but resulted in no human 
casualties. Hedlund et al. (2014) argue that the case offers a text book example of the truism that 
if accidents are not investigated, and root causes not identified, they recur. Had the company 
chosen to rebuild the facility in 2010, which this time they did not, a future repeat explosion 
would be likely. 
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Fires and explosions in biomass pellet plant, Canada (2010) 
On December 19, 2010, an explosion blasted the Pacific BioEnergy wood pellet plant in 
Prince George, British Columbia, Canada. Fires were fought by 17 firefighters from three local 
fire services and damage was reported as being "major". Two back-to-back explosions rocked 
this same pellet plant on March 31, 2008, and a fire broke out at the plant in August 2009 
(ForestTalk 2010). 
 
Dust explosion in hammer mill section of pellet plant, Germany (2009) 
In Ettenheim, Germany, a pellet producer reported a dust explosion in the hammer mill, 
which is the pulverization step before compressing the biomass into pellets. This was said to be a 
"quite normal" occurrence in this kind of facility, they had two such incidents in July alone (BZ 
2009). 
 
Explosion at the world’s largest pellet plant, Georgia, USA, 2011 
The Waycross facility in Georgia, USA, owned by RWE, is the largest pellet facility in the 
world with an annual production about 750,000 t. In late June 2011 a dust explosion sparked by 
an overheated roller-bearing assembly led to a shut-down. Repairs and modifications to the plant 
were completed in mid-July 2011. The explosion occurred in the early morning resulting in no 
casualties (RIM 2011). There does not appear to be additional information available on this 
incident in the public domain. 
 
Explosion at “Inferno Pellets”, USA, 2013 
A dust explosion at “Inferno Pellets” in East Providence, Rhode Island, NY, USA, took 
place Aug 20, 2013. The explosion threw a worker 20 feet initiating a fire covering an area 
roughly the size of a football field. More than 100 firefighters were called to battle the blaze 
(Dujardin 2013). At one point, firefighters were pulled out of the building because the fire had 
spread up into the roof area, making it unsafe for firefighters (Rupp 2013). 
Kalunian (2013) later reported that the local Fire Department had been called to Inferno 
Wood Pellets 42 times in the last 12 months, but that the local fire chief said he “didn't think that 
was excessive”.  
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Port of Tyne, UK (2011) 
On Oct 30, 2011, a 100,000 m3 stockpile of wood pellets at the Port of Tyne, UK, caught 
fire early Sunday morning. Wood pellets received at the port are taken by train to the biomass 
fueled Drax power station in Yorkshire. The pellets were said to have ignited spontaneously deep 
inside the pile in a 150 m by 60 m concrete storage unit. The port had a fire monitoring system 
but unfortunately the fire was only detected by the system when a deep seated fire had taken 
hold. Firefighting efforts were initially delayed because a build-up of carbon monoxide first had 
to be cleared. Then firefighters began digging into the stockpile with mechanical diggers to 
uncover the burning wood pellets and extinguish the flames. The process was said to be 
relatively simple but very time-consuming. The port stated there was no damage to property and 
minimal impact on port operations (Butcher 2011). 
 
Nature's Flame pellet factory in Rotokawa, New Zealand, 2013 
On September 4, 2013, Nature's Flame in Rotokawa, New Zealand, a business providing 
sustainable wood pellet heating, suffered a dust explosion and a major fire. There were no reports 
of injuries. Information is sketchy, but the dust explosion was said to have involved two saw dust 
hoppers (NZH 2013). 
 
New England pellet mill dust explosion and fires, USA, 2011 
On October 20, 2011, a wood pellet manufacturing facility in New Hampshire, USA, 
experienced a series of fires and dust explosions. A problem in a pellet mill caused a spark or 
ember to travel from the mill, along a collection conveyor, up a bucket elevator, then along a 
second conveyor and into the pellet cooler where wood pellets ignited and caused a combustible 
dust-related major fire. The fire then travelled through a bucket elevator transport system to a 
storage silo.  
It also spread through the ductwork to a dust collector, which exploded. The duct burst 
open and released the pressure of the deflagration inside the building near firefighters, who were 
responding to the fire. The dust collector's door was blown off its hinges, creating a missile 
hazard. The explosion blew out through an undersized explosion vent onto two storage silos, 
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which were ignited.  
This accident is both interesting and noteworthy. Interesting, because the broad palette of 
solid biomass hazards plays out: ignition, fire, travelling embers, explosion, missile and 
escalation. Noteworthy, because the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) citation offers a rare rich description of consequences and safety deficiencies (OSHA 
2012). 
The OSHA citations for unsafe fire and explosion conditions were numerous. Following 
the explosion and fire at the wood pellet mill, OSHA inspectors found excessive layers of 
combustible dust on numerous horizontal surfaces in the production, dryer, and hammer mill 
rooms. This hazardous condition is a prelude to a secondary catastrophic explosion if the dust 
layers become airborne and ignite following a primary dust explosion. The poor housekeeping 
situation was exacerbated when OSHA inspectors discovered that employees were using 
compressed air at excessive pressures to clean workplace surfaces. This improper work practice 
generates dust clouds at explosive concentrations.  
These operational deficiencies were only the tip of the iceberg in the hazardous fire and 
explosion conditions in the wood pellet mill. Beneath the surface were insufficient engineering 
control measures required in minimizing the severity of consequence when a fire or explosion 
occurs. For example, best engineering practices require spark detection and fire suppression in 
addition to isolation of interconnected process equipment so as to prevent the propagation of fires 
and explosion throughout a facility.  
Process equipment lacking such fire and explosion engineering controls included the pellet 
mill, pellet cooler, silos, dust collectors, and conveyor system. Facility design is another crucial 
area. For instance, OSHA also cited the facility for the improper location of the hammer mill 
located indoors exposing workers to combustible dust fire explosion hazards. This type of 
equipment is allowed indoors only if located in a detached building or separated from other 
production areas by damage limiting construction as noted in the National Fire Protection 
Association combustible dust standards. 
Best engineering practices in facility design shall also include the location of the rotary 
dryer outdoors, or in a separate detached building, or in a separate cut-off room protected by 
damage limiting construction. OSHA cited the facility for this deficiency in addition to the 
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failure of the employer to ensure the rotary dryer was inspected and cleaned of built up 
combustible dust and resin deposits. Managing fuel sources is only one leg of the fire triangle 
that must be addressed in minimizing the probability of occurrence. 
OSHA inspectors also found that management failed to comprehensively manage unique 
ignition sources. These potential ignition sources include portable industrial vacuum cleaners and 
powered industrial truck such as fork lifts, wheel loaders, etc.,. that need to be rated for operation 
in potential explosive atmospheres.  
The OSHA citations at this wood pellet facility following the fire and explosions provide 
excellent examples with lessons-learned, illustrating the importance of information sharing in 
implementing best engineering and operational practices. 
 
DISCUSSION  
Insufficient Attention Given to the Hazards of Wood Pellets  
In 2010, Gordon Murray, the executive director of the Wood Pellet Association of Canada, 
gave this blunt and vivid account of the hazards of the wood pellet business:  
“The wood pellet business is hazardous. Dock workers have unknowingly entered loaded 
ship holds and perished from carbon monoxide emitted by wood pellets. Many times, rainwater 
has leaked into a storage silo, causing the pellets to self-heat and eventually burst into 
catastrophic fire. Workers trying to extinguish the fire then cut holes in the side of the silo, only 
to cause explosions, injuries, and deaths. […] Such incidents happen too frequently, not only in 
Canada, but in pellet plants around the world. […] Canadian insurance companies have 
recently told the pellet industry that its performance must improve or else pellet plants will no 
longer be insurable. […] Pellet producers must create an industry-wide culture in which the 
health and safety of workers is an overriding priority” (Murray 2010). 
There is anecdotal evidence of numerous small combustible dust-related fires and 
occasional dust explosions in Danish biomass pellet operations. But firm empirical data are 
difficult to obtain. There is little mention of incidents in public sources, there is no central 
registry, and as long as incidents occur on private property resulting in no-casualties referred to 
as “near misses” and only cause limited property loss, they appear to cause minimal attention. 
More succinctly, paraphrasing Vaughan (1996), a process of “normalization of deviance” appears 
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to take place.  
A pellet facility in Denmark manufactures about 100,000 t per year of biomass pellets. 
International experience referred to above indicates that facilities of this kind are known to 
experience frequent combustible dust-related fires and explosions. Yet, judged from the lack of 
publicly available information, the facility would appear to have avoided the fires and explosions 
occurring at similar biomass pellet facilities abroad. A wide search in the comprehensive 
Infomedia database covering all Danish news media articles since about 1990, produces only a 
single local news account of a silo fire at the facility.  
Inspired by the fire and explosion at “Inferno Pellets” in 2013 referred to above, after 
which Kalunian (2013) reported that the local Fire Department had been called to the facility 42 
times in the last 12 months, we decided to carry out a similar analysis. The Danish fire services 
keep a central registry (ODIN) of fire station turnouts. All fires at the pellet facility can 
reasonably be assumed to be related solely to pellet production and handling. The ODIN database 
was interrogated for turnouts to the facility for the period December 2006 to October 2012. These 
produced 58 turnouts, of which 23 were blind (alarm from automatic fire-detection system, but 
no fire) and 6 were false. The remaining 29 were real, corresponding to a real fire every 73 days.  
The pellet facility is certified to ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001 and it publishes a yearly 
“Grønt regnskab”, which translates into a “Green statement”. The green statements for 2011 and 
2012 comprise various lost time injury (LTI) metrics and identify the most important working 
environment issues under the following five headings: 1) noise, including bad acoustics; 2) 
psychosocial issues; 3) indoor environment issues, drafts and cold spots, radiant heat and indoor 
air quality; 4) accident risks, slips, falls, nip points between rotating machine components, fire 
and explosion, hazards arising from contact with electricity and other energy sources; and 5) 
nuisance dust. In our opinion, the company gives genuine attention to occupational health and 
safety. Nevertheless, the green statements do not mention a single fire incident despite that ODIN 
registrations indicate at least eight real fires for the period. The green statements identify 14 
workplace health and safety issues, only the 11th is fire and explosion. We are perplexed at this 
finding and wonder if green reporting and environmental statements, even if they have sections 
covering occupational health and safety, adequately capture occupational accident risk. Because 
only one fire incident found way into news media we suspect that gross underreporting is the 
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norm. 
Although we cannot say that we have meticulously examined each and every life cycle 
analysis (LCA) on the use of solid biomass as a sustainable carbon-neutral and environmentally 
friendly energy source, we have yet to identify a LCA study that has even identified the quite 
manifest combustible dust fire and explosion risks, less, of course, has sought to address this 
adverse effect in the policy recommendations. The Danish Energy Authority recently tendered for 
an analysis of environmental and climate effects of producing and using biomass for electricity, 
heat and transportation in Denmark (DEA 2012b). The tender is silent on safety issues. This 
corroborates the general picture, that environmental sustainability interventions seem to have a 
blind spot towards occupational accident risk. 
 
Evidence of Limited Information Exchange and Learning 
Most industrial accident prevention professionals are familiar with the Heinrich triangle 
and its stipulation that every major accident is preceded by a number of minor accidents, which 
in turn are preceded by a larger number of near-misses (Phimister et al. 2004). According to this 
theory, we will soon be running out of luck. 
After the 2012 Tilbury Power Station, UK, fire the company RWE conducted an internal 
investigation. There are some suggestions that the pellet fire may have started on a conveyor belt. 
While this may have a familiar ring, the real concern to accident prevention professionals should 
be the popular practice of carrying out internal investigations, which are not released into the 
public domain. This is also true for major Danish players that although being certified to ISO 
14001 and OHSAS 18001, and having Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies do not 
engage in broad lessons learned dissemination activities to prevent recurrence elsewhere.  
It is a familiar and age old problem across industries. It’s a shame. It is also only to be 
expected. Milton Friedman’s dictum “The business of business is business” implies that spending 
company resources to investigate and report lessons learned for the benefit of others would make 
a weak business case. Only expenses are visible; negative publicity is a concern and benefits are 
at best uncertain and intangible. We believe that some sort of regulatory intervention is required 
to translate the seemingly straightforward ideal of information sharing into something workable 
in practice.  
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The failure to do so and the general failure to address safety risks appear particularly 
disheartening in a setting with brimming Danish ambitions to become the world leader in 
sustainable biomass usage, no expenditure spared, and colossal costs passed to tax-payers and 
energy consumers.  
 
Media Shifting and Inherent Safety– Two Under-Studied Issues 
While the concept of media shifting is not new (Ashford 1997) we argue that the attention 
given to the subject has been rather limited and that the extent of the problem is under-studied. 
We remark that media shifting can be observed in other environmental interventions. We provide 
two examples. 
First, we note that flue gas NOX reduction by means of Selective Catalytic Reduction 
(SCR) technology requires injection of ammonia into the smokestack. While the SCR technology 
is very clever, two toxic substances react to produce inert nitrogen, the introduction of toxic 
ammonia creates a new hazard at the workplace. To the extent that the process is designed for 
anhydrous ammonia, a liquefied toxic gas stored under pressure, road transport of this substance 
creates new hazards and the anhydrous ammonia storage vessel at the site may constitute a 
hazard for the surrounding community. For safety reasons, some countries, e.g., USA, only 
permit the use of an aqueous ammonia solution, which is considerably less hazardous than 
anhydrous ammonia. Anhydrous ammonia is the least expensive reagent to use from a capital and 
operating cost basis however, and is popular in Danish SCR units.  
Second, we draw attention to the emerging practice of shifting from diesel or other non-
volatile oils to natural gas as a transportation fuel. We argue that this change runs counter to long 
established core principles of inherent safety and risk reduction, for instance laid down in the 
ATEX directive, because a low-risk fuel is substituted for a high-risk one. At present, there are 
two drivers for this change, an economic and an environmental driver. Large discoveries of 
natural gas in shale-rock formations throughout North America and elsewhere are reshaping fuel 
markets pushing natural-gas prices down at a time when diesel costs have soared due to higher 
world petroleum prices (WSJ 2012). The environmental driver is a desire to curb carbon dioxide 
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emissions from the transportation sector2, which has so far proven to be difficult. As safety 
professionals we are particularly troubled by the introduction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 
ferryboats and passenger vessels because of the large number of people onboard, the inability to 
escape in case of explosion and fire, and the tremendous obstacles associated with evacuation of 
large numbers of passengers from a damaged vessel at sea. Vinnem (2008) criticizes the location 
of an LNG facility for bunkering of marine vessels in Risavika, Norway, claiming that the 
contribution to societal risk was insufficiently addressed.  
The Danish authorities recently carried out a North European LNG marine infrastructure 
feasibility study. The study considered benefits in a strategic perspective and stated that LNG is 
an obvious fuel alternative as it has environmental and climate change (and cost) advantages 
compared to oil-based fuels (DMA 2012). In stark contrast, safety issues were not given strategic 
consideration. The study considered loading of LNG tank trucks a “well established technique” 
and was satisfied that road traffic with LNG trucks is “subject to detailed national and local 
safety regulations” and hence, by implication, presumably a negligible hazard. Potential third-
party concerns were waved away as “lack of knowledge and scaremongering” and it was hoped 
that stringent classification rules and regulations for gas carriers would make them “equally safe 
as other types of ships and will not pose any additional risk contribution to the ship traffic 
situation at sea and in ports” (DMA 2012:161-162).  
The tendency to prioritize environmental benefits over safety concerns seems to run deep 
and not confined to the realm of solid biomass only. 
 
CONCLUSION  
This paper argues that solid biomass is not only greener and more expensive than coal, it is 
also more dangerous, and that the unsafe properties of biomass have been largely overlooked in 
the haste to cut greenhouse gas emissions. 
Biomass pellets generate combustible dust in quantities presenting a serious dust explosion 
hazard, the blast from the explosion is more severe and because pellets are sensitive to moisture 
                                                     
2The substitution will also curb sulphur dioxide emissions from ship engines. We do not consider this as an 
environmental driver, as it could be achieved simply by using low-sulphur diesel.  
21 
 
they are handled in enclosures, which increase the dust explosion risks. They easily ignite, from 
friction or sparks, and may self-ignite if moist. Smoldering fires are difficult to detect and embers 
may migrate in the conveyor systems and develop into massive storage fires that cause extensive 
damage.  
Wood dust hazards at lumber yards and sawmills may have been grandfathered as tolerable 
risks. The number of facilities is limited however, and the quantities handled relatively modest. 
This changes dramatically if solid biomass is used for power and heat generation. The 
intensification and complexities that come with the rapid scale-up and the handling of 
unprecedented quantities of solid biomass fuels call for increased attention to safety. The number 
of serious accidents indicates that biomass pellets represent an emerging risk for which proper 
control strategies have yet to be developed.  
Environmental ambitions are very high and the costs to society of introducing solid 
biomass fuels are breathtaking. In this setting, the general failure to address safety risks appears 
particularly disheartening. Further research is needed to provide policy guidance on how to 
improve this situation. Because there is currently no mechanism to register fire and explosion 
incidents involving biomass pellets, a natural starting point would be to rectify this shortage of 
fundamental data. Systematic incident information capture and exchange, understanding the 
fundamental root causes, widely disseminating the lessons learned, and integrating these lessons 
learned into safe operations, are key to improving the safety performance of the expanding 
bioenergy industries.  
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